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Abstract: Extreme overvalued beliefs (EOB) are rigidly held, non-deusional beliefs that are the
motive behind most acts of terrorism and mass shootings. EOBs are differentiated from delusions
and obsessions. The concept of an overvalued idea was first described by Wernicke and later
applied to terrorism by McHugh. Our group of forensic psychiatrists (Rahman, Resnick, Harry)
refined the definition as an aid in the differential diagnosis seen in acts of violence. The form
and content of EOBs is discussed as well as group effects, conformity, and obedience to authority.
Religious cults such as The People’s Temple, Heaven’s Gate, Aum Shinrikyo, and Islamic State (ISIS)
and conspiracy beliefs such as assassinations, moon-hoax, and vaccine-induced autism beliefs are
discussed using this construct. Finally, some concluding thoughts on countering violent extremism,
including its online presence is discussed utilizing information learned from online eating disorders
and consumer experience.
Keywords: psychosis; delusion; overvalued idea; terrorism; mass shootings; violence;
forensic psychiatry
1. Introduction
Extreme overvalued beliefs are a predominant motive behind global and homegrown violent
and terrorist attacks. This operational definition differentiates idiosyncratic, psychotic thinking from
shared subcultural beliefs or ideologies [1,2]. Terrorism is a behavior that comes with enormous direct
and indirect costs. Its detection and prevention are challenging due to the increasing presence of online
and social media radicalization [3]. The term extreme overvalued belief, derived from earlier definitions,
is critical to understanding the psychopathology seen in acts of terrorism, cults, mass suicides,
mass shootings, and online radicalization. Media and behavioral health specialists often erroneously
report terrorist attacks, mass shootings, and cults as based on delusional, paranoid, or obsessional
beliefs. The definition of extreme overvalued belief was recently defined to aid in the development
of a differential diagnosis during criminal responsibility evaluations [1,2]. The definition may have
potential use as a tool in the primary prevention of violence stemming from extreme overvalued beliefs.
This article reviews the concept of an overvalued idea, first defined by Carl Wernicke and later
applied to psychopathology seen in acts of terrorism, cults, and mass shootings [1,4]. The discussion
will begin by describing how the term overvalued idea has evolved in the psychiatric literature in
describing conditions such as eating disorders and its application to violent behavior seen in mass
suicides, cults, terrorism, and online radicalization. Finally, the discussion will turn to how the social
transmission of beliefs occur to gain a better understanding of how extreme overvalued beliefs form
and thus has important implications for the prevention of terrorism and mass deaths stemming from
extreme overvalued beliefs.
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2. Background and Definition
There has previously been a lack of agreement as to what precisely constitutes an overvalued
idea [5]. Clarification regarding the proper definitions of overvalued beliefs, delusion, and obsession is
needed to understand the motive behind violent criminal acts [2]. Our group of forensic psychiatrists
(Rahman, Resnick, Harry) at the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law examined the motive in
the Anders Breivik mass murder case [1]. In that case, Breivik held bizarre and rigidly held beliefs that
were found to be motives behind his bombing and mass shooting attack, which resulted in the deaths
of 72 mostly young people in Norway. A team of examining psychiatrists erroneously believed that
he held delusions stemming from schizophrenia. After reviewing a second team’s findings that he
was legally responsible for the crimes, the court declared that he, in fact, had extremist beliefs shared
by other right-winged groups in Norway and not idiosyncratic, fixed, false beliefs from delusions.
We introduced the term extreme overvalued belief to describe the rigidly held non-delusional beliefs that
Breivik held during his attacks. We went further to apply the construct to explain motives behind
other acts of terrorism such as the Oklahoma City bombing(McVeigh and Nichols) as well as the 9/11
terrorist attacks [1,2]. We defined the term extreme overvalued belief as follows:
An extreme overvalued belief is one that is shared by others in a person’s cultural, religious,
or subcultural group. The belief is often relished, amplified, and defended by the possessor
of the belief and should be differentiated from an obsession or a delusion. The belief grows
more dominant over time, more refined and more resistant to challenge. The individual
has an intense emotional commitment to the belief and may carry out violent behavior in
its service. [1,2]
This definition expands on what was first described as an overvalued idea by Wernicke in Gundriss
der Psychiatrie (1906) and later invoked by then psychiatrist-in-chief Paul McHugh at Johns Hopkins
in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks [4,6]. This definition may aid examiners in determining
motives in violent attacks, where similar rigidly held, non-delusional beliefs are present. FBI forensic
behavioral specialists Matt Logan and Reid Meloy have approached this topic with similar descriptive
findings [7,8]. Logan discussed his findings in Lone Wolf Killers: A Perspective on Overvalued Ideas.
He argues that lone wolf killers have over-idealizing beliefs that develop into such overriding
importance that the beliefs define the identity of the individual [7]. Meloy, in response to the 9/11
attacks, submitted a description of a Violent True Believer to the Behavioral Analysis Program of
the FBI. The purpose of the advisory paper was to gain psychological knowledge concerning the
homicidal-suicidal state of mind seen in terrorism. The violent true believer, he argued, is an individual
committed to an ideology or belief system that advances homicide and suicide as a legitimate means
to further a particular goal [8]. These findings are congruous with extreme overvalued belief as the
putative belief system and mechanism for the motives behind this type of violent behavior.
3. Ueberwerthige Idee (Overvalued Idea)
Carl Wernicke (1848–1905) was chair of psychiatry and neurology at Breslau and later chair
at the University of Halle (Germany) in 1904, just before his premature death from a bicycle
accident. He is honored by having his name describe neuropathology seen in Wernicke’s aphasia
and Wernicke–Korsakoff syndrome, but his psychiatric contributions have largely been neglected [9].
Gundriss der Psychiatrie was recently translated from German into English. In the classical description
of Ueberwerthige Idee, Wernicke stated that “special conditions must prevail before such overemphasis
takes on an aberrant character. Normally there is contradictory evidence, which gradually corrects any
overvaluation. For aberrant overvaluation, however, these counterarguments, demonstrably, are no
longer accessible”. He characterized overvalued ideas as appearing completely normal. However,
individuals may acquire an aberrant character and behavior [4]. Wernicke’s examples from the late
19th century to the early 20th century included people who committed suicide after the loss of
a fortune, after being sentenced to dishonorable punishment, or after the death of a loved one [4].
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Subsequent psychiatric literature has applied this definition to describe the psychopathology seen in
other disorders with over-idealizing values including anorexia nervosa, body dysmorphic disorder,
gender dysphoria, hypochondriasis, hoarding, morbid jealousy, litigious paranoid state, pseudocyesis,
and social phobia [5]. Women that are unable to conceive may develop over-idealization about having
a child to the point of committing suicide or even kidnapping and forcibly cutting out an infant from
a pregnant woman’s womb [10].
Wernicke’s description also captures the beliefs described by FBI profilers as the motive of many
mass shooters, terrorists, and assassins that have acted in an unpredictable and aberrant fashion [11].
Psychologists, economists, and others have not found a specific personality profile or situational
condition (e.g., poverty, oppression, or lack of education) that explains terrorism. Such behavior
does not always meet the classic personality disorder criteria seen in criminal psychopathology such
as antisocial personality disorder. Instead individuals are described as having vague psychosocial
problems in their background [12].
Two things have changed quite dramatically since Wernicke first described the overvalued idea
almost a century ago: access to information (particularly online) and access to much more lethal types
of weapons [13]. Applying Wernicke’s concept to the development of extreme overvalued beliefs,
a pathway to violence can be drawn in the following steps: (1) there are a core set of beliefs normally
shared by others in their culture/subculture; (2) as the individual is exposed to progressively more
extremist information and perceives a lack of contradictory information, reinforcement and refinement
of the extreme beliefs occur; (3) additional amplification is acquired and coupled with the use of harm
to self and/ or others in its service.
4. DSM-5 Definition of Overvalued Idea
Psychiatry has historically differentiated obsessions, delusions, and overvalued ideas from each
other. An obsessional belief is recognized by an individual as his own and intrudes forcibly into
his mind. The belief is often unpleasant and efforts are made to resist it (ego-dystonic). A delusion
is a fixed, false, and idiosyncratic belief (not shared by others). An overvalued idea, by contrast,
is a preoccupying rigidly held belief that is shared by others in a person’s culture or subculture.
The beliefs are not resisted as in obsessions, but instead are amplified and defended (ego-syntonic) [1,6].
Karl Jaspers believed that delusions were from a mental illness and that overvalued ideas stemmed
from personality features [14]. Sims, interested in religious ideology, has argued that delusions
are apparent in the context of other psychotic symptoms such as thought disorder, hallucinations,
and functioning level. He also emphasized that, in psychotic individuals, the lifestyle, behavior,
and direction of the personal goals of the individual subsequent to a religious experience are consistent
with the natural history of a mental disorder rather than with a personally enriching life experience [1].
In other words, the simplest way to differentiate a delusion from a non-delusion would be to look
for other evidence of a psychotic disorder. It is considered rare for an individual to have an isolated
symptom of delusions in the absence of other psychotic symptoms. The prevalence of a delusional
disorder, as defined in DSM-5, is 0.02%, versus 1.0% for schizophrenia. The prevalence of extreme
overvalued ideas is currently unknown [2].
To confuse matters, the DSM-5 and DSM-IV have vague and difficult to trace definitions of
overvalued idea. The manuals describe it as being “less than delusional intensity” and not shared by
others in their cultural or subcultural group. The definition does not appear at all in any of the earlier
DSM series. This places the current DSM-5 definition as the exact opposite of Wernicke’s definition,
which states that it is a belief shared by others [4]. European psychiatrists have emphasized them in
terms of categories with well-defined contours and discrete definitions. Although violence can stem
from delusions seen in psychosis, clarification of definitions is needed to empirically study rigidly held,
non-delusional, shared beliefs seen in cults, mass suicides, terrorism, and online radicalization [1,2,5].
Given this discrepancy, it is possible that individuals once categorized as having a “delusional disorder”
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may actually fit the Wernicke (not DSM) definition of overvalued idea, thus making isolated delusions
an even more uncommon entity.
5. Extreme Overvalued Belief: Possible Etiologies
When seemingly normal individuals act in a bizarre manner, it is critical for psychiatrists to
understand the cultural context of the behavior. Religious cults illustrate this concept well. The greatest
episode of deliberate loss of American lives prior to 9/11 was the mass suicide of 909 inhabitants
(304 children) of Jonestown, Guyana, from cyanide poisoning in 1978. Reverend Jim Jones, founder
of the People’s Temple instructed his followers to commit suicide while spreading rigidly held beliefs
of intelligence organizations conspiring against their temple [15]. Similarly, 39 followers of Heaven’s
Gate died in a mass suicide in California in 1999. They held rigid non-delusional beliefs that their
suicides would allow them to exit their “human vessels,” allowing their souls to go on a journey
aboard a spaceship they believed to be following comet Hale–Bopp. Some men in the group underwent
castration in preparation for their “afterlives.” The Aum Shinrikyo cult attacked a Tokyo subway with
sarin nerve gas in 1995, killing nearly a dozen people and injuring nearly 5000 [16]. The Movement for
the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God was a “doomsday cult” religious movement in which
778 people perished in a series of poisonings and killings that were either a group suicide/mass
murder by a group leaders after beliefs of an approaching apocalypse [17]. Parents of online recruited
terrorists have reported that their children had been “brainwashed” after watching Islamic State cult
(ISIS) propaganda videos. They held extreme overvalued beliefs that violent jihadist acts would allow
them and their family to go to heaven [18,19].
When beliefs are shared by others, idiosyncratic beliefs can become normalized [20]. In a study of
343 psychiatric outpatients who described themselves as religious, participants were asked to give
their view of a demonic causality of their illness. A high prevalence of such beliefs was not only found
in schizophrenia (56%) but also in non-delusional patients: affective disorders (29%), anxiety disorders
(48%), personality disorders (37%), and adjustment disorders (23%). The authors concluded that
demonic influence should be interpreted against the cultural and religious background that is shaping
causal models of mental distress in the individual [21]. Occasionally, rigidly held non-delusional
beliefs can become amplified and overvalued by an individual or group leading to extreme behavior
in its service.
Harvard psychiatrist Oliver Freudenreich’s Guide to Psychotic Disorders states that, “while most
people would not jeopardize their careers or lives for an overvalued idea, some will (and are secretly
regarded as heroes by those less inclined to fight for an idea)” [22]. It is possible that conforming to
extreme beliefs occurs through time and group effects. Solomon Asch (1951) discovered the foundation
for conformity studies. In his classic experiment, participants viewed a card with a line on it, followed
by another with three lines labeled “A,” “B,” and “C.” One of these lines was the same length as that
on the first card, and the other two lines were clearly longer or shorter. Participants were correct
when relying on their own objectivity, but when placed in groups that deliberately mislead them,
they wrongly interpreted the stimuli, believing that the majority must be correct, leading them to
erroneously answer with the majority [23]. Subsequent studies have demonstrated that some people
will passively agree and go along with the majority in a group for various reasons such as to avoid
disharmony [24].
Studies also show that a majority of persons entering cults do not necessarily exhibit
psychopathology and that current cult members appear psychologically well-adjusted, and generally
demonstrate few conspicuous symptoms of psychopathology [25]. In 1983, the American Psychological
Association created The Task Force on Deceptive and Indirect Techniques of Persuasion and Control to
investigate whether “brainwashing” or coercive practices played a role in recruitment by new religious
movements. The task force report was ultimately rejected because it “lacked scientific rigor” and
the association decided that it did not have sufficient information available to take a position on this
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issue [26]. Perhaps the definition of extreme overvalued belief better operationalizes this concept of
“brainwashing” seen in religious cult movements.
Although arguably different from religious cults, some individuals hold what appear to be odd
or idiosyncratic beliefs such as conspiracy theories involving the perceived source of assassinations
of leaders, extraterrestrial life, UFOs, etc. In some instances, individuals relish, amplify, and defend
these beliefs to the point of harm towards themselves and others. Examples include the moon-landing
hoax and vaccine-induced autism conspiracy theories [27]. American astronauts have been stalked by
individuals claiming that the moon landing was faked by NASA. Astronaut Buzz Aldrin physically
defended himself from a moon-hoax believer that was stalking him and attempting to force him to
“swear on the Bible” that he walked on the moon [28]. Parental concerns about perceived vaccine
safety issues, such as a purported association between vaccines and autism, though not supported by
a credible body of scientific evidence, led increasing numbers of parents to refuse or delay vaccination
for their children. Outbreaks of measles have sporadically been reported to be, in part, due to this
disinformation. The most frequent reason for non-vaccination stated by 69% of the parents in one
study, was concern that the vaccine might cause harm [29–31]. Overvalued ideas, many of which
are transmitted online, are at the source of these types of socially transmitted behaviors and the
consequences of these beliefs can be destructive and life threatening.
6. Psychopathology of Terrorism
Although there is general condemnation of acts of terror involving mass deaths, a better
appreciation of its psychopathology may aid in its prevention. Psychologists have pondered this
question in the past. Stanley Milgram, interested in the Jewish Holocaust, studied obedience to
authority figures with a series of experiments. In his 1973 article, The Perils of Obedience, he stated
that “ordinary people, simply doing their jobs, and without any particular hostility on their part,
can become agents in a terrible destructive process. Moreover, even when the destructive effects of their
work become patently clear, and they are asked to carry out actions incompatible with fundamental
standards of morality, relatively few people have the resources needed to resist authority”. He went on
to create an “agentic” theory in which the essence of obedience consists in the fact that a person comes
to view themselves as the instrument for carrying out another person’s wishes, and they therefore no
longer see themselves as responsible for their actions [32]. In the online world, authority figures can
also be a powerful destructive force. Milgram’s experiment may explain why it is not uncommon for
terrorists to view videos of charismatic figures online and subsequently carry out violent behavior
in the service of extreme overvalued beliefs [33]. French psychologists Tarde and LeBon described
“group mind” or “mob behavior” in the 19th century. This concept has been used by social scientists to
describe lynching and how individuals may blindly follow the lead of others. Similar to the conformity
experiments, “online crowds” have been described to gather virtually, behave and act collectively,
and produce similar effects and phenomena [34].
Justifying their behavior through narratives from online and other propaganda sources, terrorists,
mass shooters, and conspiracy believers possess a sense of moral superiority to justify their violent
acts. Anders Breivik, the 9/11 attackers, the Unabomber (Ted Kacynski), the Oklahoma City bombers,
and ISIS militants all possessed belief systems in which their respective view of moral superiority
justified agentic action [33]. Extremist propaganda invokes narratives that utilize moral superiority in
arguments calling for violence against innocents. They may argue that they are “freedom fighters”
morally justified in killing the enemy. However, the taking of innocent, unarmed lives through violent
means is an agreed upon, universally condemned act [35]. The United Nations Security Council has
stated that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, wherever,
whenever, and by whomsoever committed [36]. Psychiatry traditionally holds acts of violence against
oneself or others as being the threshold to define psychopathology [37].
Carl Jung defined archetypes that are in the “collective unconscious” of mankind. Collective
unconscious refers to experiences shared by any race or culture. These can include themes such as love,
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religion, birth, death, and innocence. These experiences exist in the subconscious of every individual
and are recreated in literature, cinema, theater, and art [38]. The taking of innocent life by an act
of terror evokes the collective unconscious of all mankind. This archetype defines the fundamental
framework for why acts of terrorism are never justified and, instead, are a form of psychopathology
stemming from extreme overvalued beliefs.
7. Eating Disorders and Overvalued Ideas
In order to better understand Wernicke’s description of amplification of belief systems from
overvalued ideas, it may be useful to examine the most widely studied type of behavior stemming
from them—eating disorders [39]. The concept of an overvalued idea has been widely used to describe
eating disorders, body dysmorphic disorders, and gender identity issues, particularly in the European
literature [5]. The negative body image and cognitive distortions seen in eating disorders amplify
in the mind of the individual, growing more dominant and form a powerful driving force behind
starvation and excessive exercise, even to the point of death. Selective eating patterns also occur in
which patients will limit their food intake to a narrow range of preferred foods. Attempts to widen
their repertoire of foods are met with resistance and counter-arguments. The behavior is slow to
develop and individuals do not suddenly develop eating disorders [39]. This parallels the restriction
of ideology and amplification that is seen in violent behavior stemming from extreme overvalued
beliefs [6].
8. Threat Assessment from Beliefs
The form and content of beliefs are important not only in psychiatric definitions, but also to
determine risk of violence. Just as there is an increased risk of violence with certain types of delusions
and not others, there is also an increased risk of violence with some types of overvalued ideas.
Overvalued ideas involving body image and weight (eating disorders), an inability to conceive
a child, or perceiving a defective body part (body dysmorphic disorder and gender dysphoria) may
create self-destructive forces that can lead to suicide. By contrast, extreme overvalued beliefs and
beliefs of moral superiority may create violent behavior. Similarly, delusions held by a person with
schizophrenia that he is Jesus likely have a lower propensity towards violence than a person with
persecutory delusions of being stalked by his neighbor [40]. The form and content of beliefs may
also help explain why there is a much higher rate of male offenders seen in acts of terrorism or mass
shootings and the predominately high female rate seen in anorexia nervosa. It is possible that both
sexes experience a similar rate of overvalued ideology but have different types of behaviors stemming
from the content of their rigidly held beliefs. Further studies are needed using new operational
definitions to determine this.
9. Online Eating Disorder Data
Peer and media effects can contribute to the worsening of eating disorder behaviors by intensifying
previously held rigid beliefs regarding weight and eating. A meta-analysis showed that pro-eating
disorder websites have a large effect on refining and amplifying the dysfunctional body image and
eating habits seen in eating disorders. In a Stanford cross-sectional study of 698 families of patients
(aged 10–22 years) diagnosed with an eating disorder, 41% of patients visited pro-recovery sites,
35.5% visited pro-eating disorder sites, 25.0% visited both, and 48.7% visited neither. Of those that
visited pro-eating disorder sites, 96.0% reported learning new weight loss or purging techniques.
The authors concluded that pro-eating disorder website visits were prevalent among adolescents with
eating disorders and that parents had little knowledge of this [41]. This parallels the reports from
family members of terrorists and mass murderers that reported not knowing that they viewed radical
Internet content prior to their violent acts.
Eating disorder treatment units are equipped with a comprehensive treatment strategy including
group therapy that challenges patients’ dysfunctional narrative thereby extinguishing maladaptive
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behaviors. Research on the impact of censorship/criminalization of pro-eating disorder websites
has concluded that it further isolates and insulates the eating disorder sufferer. Banning the use of
these websites may in fact worsen the behavior—users migrate to other, more secret websites, and the
overvalued ideas begin to hold more valence. Instead, balancing the pro-eating disorder content
with pro-recovery content may be a more effective strategy. For example, in 2012, Instagram made
some hashtags unsearchable and disabled accounts that promoted eating disorders. Studies found
that pro-eating disorder hashtags actually multiplied as people instead used deliberately misspelled
hashtags like #anorexique to circumvent banned terms. Instagram later released a tool where users
could anonymously flag a photo they deemed concerning for an eating disorder. Instagram will send
the user a note of support along with directions to resources where they can get help [42]. This may
serve as an effective model for preventing the development of online extreme overvalued beliefs [12].
10. Countering Violent Extremism
Countering violent extremism (CVE) is a broad phrase that covers a wide array of approaches
that have been advanced to reduce the radicalizing effects of extremist narratives. Under the Obama
administration, the U.S. developed a Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners
to Prevent Violent Extremism. It has three objectives: (1) enhancing federal community engagement
efforts related to CVE, (2) developing greater government and law enforcement expertise for preventing
violent extremism, and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda [43].
Several programs in Muslim states (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Yemen, Indonesia, and Singapore)
have utilized de-radicalization programs carried out by moderate Muslim clerics who engaged
detainees in a theological dialogue about what they portrayed as a correct interpretation of Islam [44].
In response to growing right-winged extremism, the Canadian government has begun to consider
similar counter-extremist narratives, building on the strengths and expertise of diverse sectors in
society [45].
The Internet has been of increasing interest in efforts to counter violent extremism in recent
years. Attempts have been made to classify and identify extremist social media messaging using
linguistic features such as offensive terms to discriminate hate and extremism promoting messages
from other messages [46]. To better understand how a radicalized individual begins to amplify his
beliefs, an examination of the way the Internet utilizes individual consumer information for advertising
is helpful. Digital advertisers have used small computer files called cookies and now use canvas
fingerprinting to detect the subtle differences in the rendering of text to extract a consistent fingerprint
that can easily be used without the consumer’s awareness. Publishers place paid advertising on
their websites and mobile applications to provide customers with tailored products or services [47].
The information can help, for instance, to find more books by an author they enjoy reading or have
a movie title suggested to them based on interest in a topic. The information is honed and tailored
over time to accurately detect and influence shopping habits [48]. A similar feedback effect occurs
with online information searches. Persons searching radical material on an online video may receive
progressively more similar radical content with additional videos and social media newsfeeds [49].
The refinement of online eating disorder and consumer shopping consumption parallels extremist
consumption of radical ideology. Coupled with authority figures, conformity, and group minds,
a weapon is easily created online and spread virally. The number of views (“likes” or with emoticons)
can also be fabricated to virtually enhance this powerful social effect [50].
11. Online Social Transmission of Extreme Overvalued Beliefs
Research has also shown that people on the political extremes are more likely to perceive large
partisan differences and political polarization and to be intolerant of people with different political
beliefs [51]. A study of 61 million Facebook users demonstrated that the online world can affect
significant real-world behavior on a large scale. They revealed that the effect of social transmission
on real-world voting was greater than the direct effect of the messages themselves, and nearly all
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transmission occurred between “close friends” who were more likely to have a face-to-face relationship.
These results suggest that strong ties are instrumental for spreading both online and real-world
behavior in human social networks. People are also reluctant to correct misinformation in their
memories if it fits in with their political beliefs [52]. Some studies have offered solutions that can easily
be adapted to online search engines and newsfeeds, such as providing people with a narrative that
replaces the gap left by false information and focusing on facts rather than the myths [53]. Extreme and
false beliefs are clearly a new cyber-weapon used by extremists and even by foreign powers during
elections [54]. Further research may help elucidate the use of the Internet and search engine functions
to identify and neutralize extremist and false narratives using what has been learned about online
amplification and extreme overvalued beliefs from past online experience [55].
12. Conclusions
The available literature regarding the psychopathology of violent extremism will require new
definitions and strategies to counter it. Ultimately, terrorism and mass shootings are behaviors—ones
with a large magnitude of effects. Similar to psychiatry’s experience with eating disorders, it is
likely that merely attempting to ban extreme/radical content would be ineffective and encourage
further secrecy and extremism. Instead, providing viewers of extreme content with alternate material
containing a contradictory, factual message may help to decrease the development of extreme
overvalued beliefs. Social transmission (person to person) is a more effective tool and the production
of counter-narrative messages could be created to serve several functions: (1) prevent the user from
progressing to further extremist ideology through time (amplification of beliefs), (2) disrupt the
extremist messaging through counter narratives, and (3) reduce the online crowd effect by modifying
the number of extremist message “views.” A number of possibilities may be useful, and combining
them with artificial intelligence may prove more effective. Advisory panels from different cultural,
political, medical, ethical, and religious groups can provide needed counter-narratives. Large-scale
public awareness can be used to interrupt the social transmission of psychopathology of overvaluation
seen in mass murders, acts of terrorism, mass suicides, avoidance of immunizations, etc. Further public
health initiatives must be created to prevent extremism. Public awareness of getting the facts and not
discarding them in favor of false information or an overvalued ideology is important. Harnessing the
power of the Internet to produce Internet tools for counter-narratives and automated fact checking and
new artificial intelligence designs to chase and neutralize radical and incorrect facts may constitute
useful research [56]. Consumer-driven Internet marketing may serve as important models in this
endeavor. Education programs similar to ones used in eating disorders, tobacco products, driving
while intoxicated, fire prevention, and seat belt utilization may also be helpful. All are now seen
as important primary prevention programs. As weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical,
and nuclear) become more prevalent and easily accessible, it is critical that mankind begins the process
of the primary prevention of violence stemming from extreme overvalued beliefs.
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